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Determinants of judgments of explanatory power: Credibility, Generality, and Statistical 
Relevance 
Matteo Colombo, Leandra Bucher, & Jan Sprenger 
Abstract Explanation is a central concept in human psychology. Drawing upon philosophical 
theories of explanation, psychologists have recently begun to examine the relationship between 
explanation, probability and causality. Our study advances this growing literature in the intersection 
of psychology and philosophy of science by systematically investigating how judgments of 
explanatory power are affected by (i) the prior credibility of a potential explanation, (ii) the causal 
framing used to describe the explanation, (iii) the generalizability of the explanation, and (iv) its 
statistical relevance for the evidence. Collectively, the results of our five experiments support the 
hypothesis that the prior credibility of a causal explanation plays a central role in explanatory 
reasoning: first, because of the presence of strong main effects on judgments of explanatory power, 
and second, because of the gate-keeping role it has for other factors. Highly credible explanations 
were not susceptible to causal framing effects. Instead, highly credible hypotheses were sensitive to 
the effects of factors which are usually considered relevant from a normative point of view: the 
generalizability of an explanation, and its statistical relevance for the evidence. These results 
advance current literature in the philosophy and psychology of explanation in three ways. First, they 
yield a more nuanced understanding of the determinants of judgments of explanatory power, and the 
interaction between these factors. Second, they illuminate the close relationship between prior 
beliefs and explanatory power. Third, they clarify the relationship between abductive and 
probabilistic reasoning. 
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Explanation is a central concept in human psychology. It supports a wide array of cognitive 
functions, including reasoning, categorization, learning, inference, and decision-making (Lombrozo, 
2006; Keil & Wilson, 2000; Keil, 2006). When presented with an explanation of why a certain 
event occurred, how a certain mechanism works, or why people behave the way they do, both 
scientists and laypeople have strong intuitions about what counts as a good explanation. Yet, more 
than sixty years after philosophers of science began to elucidate the nature of explanation (Craik, 
1943; Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948;  Hempel, 1965; Carnap, 1966; Salmon, 1971), the determinants 
of judgments of explanatory power remain unclear. 
 In this paper, we present five experiments on factors that may affect judgments of 
explanatory power. Motivated by a large body of theoretical results in  epistemology and 
philosophy of science,  as well as by a growing amount of empirical work in cognitive psychology  
(for respective surveys see Woodward, 2014; Lombrozo, 2012), we examined how judgments of 
explanatory power are affected by  (i) the prior credibility of a potential explanation, (ii) the causal 
framing used to describe the explanation, (iii) the generalizability of the explanation, and (iv) its 
statistical relevance for the evidence. 
 Specifically, we set out to test four hypotheses. First, we hypothesized that the prior 
credibility of a causal explanation predicts judgments of explanatory power. Throughout all five 
experiments, we manipulated the prior credibility of different explanations, and examined the 
effects of this manipulation on explanatory judgments. We also wanted to understand how low and 
high prior credibility interacted with other possible psychological determinants of explanatory 
power. 
 Our focus on the prior credibility of causal explanation was motivated by the fact that most 
philosophical and psychological analyses of explanatory power agree that powerful explanations 
provide information about credible causal relationships (Salmon, 1984; Lewis, 1986; Dowe, 2000). 
Credible causal information facilitates the manipulation and control of nature (Pearl, 2000; 
Woodward, 2003; Strevens, 2008) and plays distinctive roles in human psychology (Lombrozo, 
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2011; Sloman & Lagnado, 2015). For example, credible causal information guides categorization 
(Carey, 1985, 201ff; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Lombrozo, 2009), supports inductive inference and 
learning (Holyoak & Cheng, 2011; Legare & Lombrozo, 2014; Walker et al. 2014), and calibrates 
metacognitive strategies involved in problem-solving (Chi et al, 1994; Aleven & Koedinger, 2002). 
 Our second, related hypothesis was that presenting an explanatory hypothesis in causal 
terms predicts judgments of its explanatory power. Thus, we wanted to find out whether people’s 
explanatory judgments are sensitive to causal framing effects. 
 The importance of this issue should be clear in the light of the fact that magazines and 
newspapers very often, even when it’s not warranted, describe scientific explanations in terms of 
causal language (e.g., ‘Processed meat causes cancer’ or ‘Economic recession leads to xenophobic 
violence’) with the aim of capturing readers’ attention and boosting their sense of understanding 
(Entmann 1993; Scheufele & Scheufele 2010).  By combining prior credibility and causal framing 
as predictors of judgments of explanatory power, Experiment 1 and 2 examined the impact of 
causality on the explanatory power of scientific hypotheses. 
 With Experiment 3, we tested the hypothesis that the generalizability (or scope) of a 
hypothesis determines its explanatory power. Specifically, we isolated the effects of generalizability 
on judgments´ explanatory power and its interaction with the prior credibility of an explanation, 
while controlling for causal framing and statistical relevance. 
 While the generalizability of scientific results is an obvious epistemic virtue that figures in 
the evidential assessments made by scientists, its relation to explanatory power is less clear. 
Previous psychological findings about the role of generalizability in explanatory reasoning are 
mixed. Read & Marcus-Newhall (1993) found that generalizability predicts explanatory judgments. 
Preston & Epley (2005) showed that hypotheses that apply to a wide range of observations are 
judged as more valuable. However, these studies involved no uncertainty about whether or not a 
causal effect was actually observed  (cf., Khemlani, Sussman, & Oppenheimer, 2011). So, whether 
or not generalizability is a robust determinant of explanatory judgment remains unclear. 
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 With Experiments 4 and 5, we tested our fourth and final hypothesis: that the statistical 
relevance of a hypothesis for a body of observed evidence is another key determinant of judgments 
of explanatory power. 
 According to several philosophers, the power of an explanation is manifest in the amount of 
statistical information that an explanans H provides about an explanandum E.  In particular, it has to 
be the case that Prob (E|H&S) > Prob (E|S) (Jeffrey, 1969; Greeno, 1970; Salmon, 1970). Suppose, 
for example, that Jones has strep infection, and his doctor gives him penicillin. After Jones has 
taken penicillin, he recovers within one week. When we explain why Jones recovered, we usually 
cite statistically relevant facts, such as the different recovery rates among treated and untreated 
patients. 
 Developing this idea, several research groups have put forward probabilistic measures of 
explanatory power (McGrew, 2003; Schupbach & Sprenger, 2011; Crupi & Tentori, 2012). Their 
approach is that a hypothesis is the more explanatorily powerful the less surprising it makes the 
observed evidence. Results from experimental psychology confirm this insight. Schupbach (2011) 
provided evidence that Schupbach & Sprenger’s (2011) probabilistic measure is an accurate 
predictor of people’s explanatory judgments in abstract reasoning problems. Colombo, Postma, & 
Sprenger (2016) found that explanatory judgments about everyday situations are strongly affected 
by changes in statistical relevance. Despite these results, it remains unclear how statistical relevance 
interacts with other, probabilistic and non-probabilistic factors to determine explanatory power, in 
particular the prior credibility of an explanation. Experiment 4 and 5 examine the influence of 
statistical relevance in this regard, both for numerical and for visual representation of the statistical 
information. 
 Clarifying the respective impact of prior credibility and statistical relevance on judgments of 
explanatory power matters to another central topic in the philosophy and psychology of 
explanation: abductive reasoning (Lipton, 2004; Douven, 2011; Schupbach, 2016). When people 
engage in abductive reasoning, they rely on explanatory considerations to justify the conclusion that 
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a certain hypothesis is true. Specifically, people often infer the truth of that hypothesis H1 from a 
pool of candidate hypotheses H1, H2, …, Hn, that best explains available evidence E (Peirce, 1931; 
Thagard, 1989; Douven, 2011). However, whether “best explains” consists in high statistical 
relevance, generalizability, provision of a plausible cause or some other explanatory virtue remains 
controversial (van Fraassen, 1989; Okasha, 2000; Lipton, 2001, 2004; Glymour, 2014; Douven & 
Schupbach, 2015). 
 In summary, bringing together different strands of research from philosophy and 
psychology, our study asks: How do the credibility, causal framing, statistical relevance and 
generalizability of a hypothesis influence judgments of explanatory power? The pattern of our 
experimental findings supports the hypothesis that the prior credibility of a causal explanation plays 
a central role in explanatory reasoning: first, because of the presence of strong main effects on 
judgments of explanatory power, and second, because of the gate-keeping role it has for other 
factors. Highly credible explanations were not susceptible to causal framing effects, which may lead 
astray  explanatory judgment. Instead, highly credible hypotheses were sensitive to the effects of 
factors which are usually considered relevant from a normative point of view: the generalizability of 
an explanation, and its statistical relevance for the study´s results. 
 These results advance current literature in the philosophy and psychology of explanation in 
three ways. First, our results yield a more nuanced understanding of the determinants of judgments 
of explanatory power, and the interaction between these factors. Second, they illuminate the close 
relationship between prior beliefs and explanatory power. Third, they clarify the relationship 
between abductive and probabilistic reasoning. 
 
Overview of the experiments and pre-tests 
We conducted five experiments, where we systematically examined the influence of the possible 
determinants of explanatory judgment: prior credibility, causal framing, generalizability, and 
statistical relevance. To warrant the validity of the experimental material, we conducted a series of 
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pre-studies, where participants evaluated different levels of causal framing, credibility, and 
generalizability. Materials which corresponded to high, low, and neutral levels of these three factors 
were implemented in the vignettes of our five experiments, either as independent variables or as 
control variables. Material evaluation and main experiments were both conducted online on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk, utilizing the Qualtrics Survey Software. We only allowed workers with 
an approval rate > 95% and with a number of HITs approved > 5000 to submit responses. 
Instructions and material were presented in English. None of the participants took part in more than 
one experiment. 
 
Causal Framing 
In a pre-study, a sample of N = 44 participants (mean age 30.5 years, SD = 7.3, 28 male) from 
America (n = 27) and other countries rated eight brief statements, expressing relations between X 
and Y of the type “X co-occurs with Y”; “X is associated with Y”, and so on (see Appendix A for 
the complete list of statements). The statements were presented in an individually randomized order 
to the participants; only one statement was visible at a time; and going back to previous statements 
was not possible. The participants judged how strongly they agreed or disagreed that a certain 
statement expressed a causal relation between X and Y. Judgments were collected on a 7-point scale 
with options: "I strongly disagree" (-3), "I disagree", "I slightly disagree", "I neither agree nor 
disagree" (0), "I slightly agree", "I agree", "I strongly agree" (3). Based on participants’ ratings, we 
selected three types of statements for our main experiments: statements with a neutral causal 
framing (“X co-occurs with Y”), with a weak causal framing (“X is associated with Y"), and with a 
strong causal framing ("X leads to Y" and "X causes Y") (Table 1). 
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Table 1: Wordings that were perceived to express weak, neutral, and strong causal framing of the 
relationship between an explanans (X) and an explanandum (Y) 
Causal Framing Framing of the hypothesis 
Weak X is associated with Y 
Neutral X co-occurs with Y 
Strong X causes Y
1 
Strong X leads to Y 
 
 
Prior Credibility 
We identified the prior credibility of different hypotheses by asking a new sample of N = 42 
participants (mean age 30.7 years, SD = 7.5, 16 male) from America (n = 29) and other countries to 
rate a list of 24 statements (Appendix A). Participants judged how strongly they disagreed or agreed 
that a certain hypothesis was credible. For all hypotheses, we used the phrasing "... co-occurs 
with..." to avoid the influence of causal framing. Based on participants’ ratings (see Appendix A), 
we selected four statements to use in our main experiments: two were highly credible, the other two 
were highly incredible (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: The four hypotheses rated as least credible and as most credible. 
Credibility Hypothesis 
Low Eating pizza co-occurs with immunity to flu. 
Low Drinking apple juice co-occurs with anorexia. 
High Well-being co-occurs with frequent smiling 
High Consuming anabolic steroids co-occurs with physical strength. 
 
                                                          
1
According to the ratings observed in the pre-study, "X causes Y" and "Y leads to Y" express causal 
relations to an equal extent. 
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Generalizability 
We conducted a pre-study in order to determine how the description of the sample used in a 
scientific study influenced the perceived generalizability of the study’s results. This pre-study 
included two questionnaires, which were administered to two different groups of participants. One 
questionnaire presented descriptions of the samples used in scientific studies, which varied with 
regard to the number of people involved. The other questionnaire presented sample descriptions that 
varied with regard to the type of people in the sample. The statements were presented in an 
individually randomized order to the participants. Only one statement was visible at a time, and 
going back to previous statements was not possible. 
 Forty-two participants (mean age 33.5 years, SD = 10.8, 27 male) from America (n = 38) 
and other countries  were presented with a list of six brief statements about a sample of a particular 
number of participants, e.g. “The study investigates five people”; “The study investigates 500 
people” (see Appendix A for the complete list of items). We found that the perceived 
generalizability of a study increased with the number of people in the sample of the study. 
 A new group of N = 41 participants (mean age 33.0 years, SD = 9.7, 26 male) from America 
(n = 36) and other countries was presented with a list of nine brief statements about samples of 
particular types of people, e.g. "The study investigates a group of people who sit in a park”; “The 
study investigates a group of people who work at a university” (see Appendix A for the complete 
list of items). However, focusing on the number instead of the type of people in the sample allowed 
for a neater distinction between narrowly and widely generalizable results. Therefore we 
characterized generalizability as a function of the number of participants in the main vignettes of 
the experiment (see Table 3). 
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Table 3: Ratings of the generalizability of studies in the pre-tests, dependent of the number of 
people in the sample. 
Generalizability Description 
Narrow The study investigates five people. 
Medium The study investigates 240 people. 
Wide The study investigates 10,000 people. 
 
Vignettes of the Main Experiment 
All experiments were performed, using a 2х2 (within-subject) design with explanatory power as 
dependent variable and prior credibility of the hypothesis being one of the independent variables. 
The other independent variable was either causal framing, generalizability, or statistical relevance of 
the reported research study. 
 Participants were presented with four short reports about fictitious research studies. Two of 
these reports involved highly credible hypotheses, the other two reports involved incredible 
hypotheses. Two reports showed a high level of the other independent variable (causal 
framing/generalizability/statistical relevance), while the other two reports showed a low level of 
that variable. To account for the possible influence of the content of a particular report, the 
allocation of low and high levels of that variable was counterbalanced to the credibility conditions 
across the items, leading to two versions of each experiment. 
 Each vignette in our experiments followed the same format, including a headline and five 
sentences. The headline stated the hypothesis, the first sentence introduced the study, the second 
sentence described the sample size, the third sentence reported the results of the study, and the 
fourth sentence reported factors controlled by the researchers. The final sentence presented a brief 
conclusion, essentially restating the hypothesis. 
 We now present a sample vignette for a study that investigates the link between anabolic 
steroids and physical strength. For details of the vignettes in the individual experiments, see 
Appendices B-D. 
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Consuming anabolic steroids leads to physical strength 
A recent study by university researchers investigated the link between consuming anabolic steroids 
and physical strength. The researchers studied 240 persons. The level of physical strength was 
higher among participants who regularly consumed anabolic steroids than among the participants 
who did not regularly consume anabolic steroids. Family health history, age, and sex, which were 
controlled by the researchers, could not explain these results. The study therefore supports the 
hypothesis that consuming anabolic steroids leads to physical strength. 
 
In all experiments, we varied the level of prior credibility of a hypothesis. In Experiment 1 and 2, 
we also varied the causal framing and interchanged “leads to” with “causes” and “is associated 
with”, while we kept generalizability at its control value (N=240) and did not provide information 
about statistical relevance. In Experiment 3, we varied the sample size (=generalizability) and 
controlled for causal framing by using the predicate “co-occurs with” in the headline and the 
conclusion. Finally, in Experiment 4 and 5, we varied the levels of statistical relevance (=the 
frequency of a causal effect in the treatment and in the control group) while controlling for causal 
framing (“X co-occurs with Y”) and generalizability (N=240). Participants were asked to rate our 
dependent variable: the explanatory power of the stated hypothesis for the results of the study. 
 
Experiment 1 and 2. Credibility x Causal Framing 
Two-hundred-three participants (mean age 34.7 years, SD = 10.5; 121 male) from America (n= 
130), India (n = 67) and other countries completed Experiment 1 for a small monetary payment. A 
new sample of two-hundred-eight participants (mean age 34.56 years, SD = 9.97; 124 male) from 
America (n = 154), India (n = 43), and other countries completed Experiment 2 for a small 
monetary payment. 
Design and Material 
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In both experiments, participants were presented with four short reports about fictitious research 
studies along the lines of the above vignette. Across vignettes, we manipulated the causal framing 
of the relationship between hypothesis and evidence as well as the choice of the hypothesis 
(credible vs. incredible). Generalizability was controlled for by setting it to its medium value (240 
participants). Two of the four reports involved highly credible hypotheses, the other two reports 
involved incredible hypotheses. Similarly, two of these reports used weak causal framing 
(Experiment 1 and 2: “X is associated with Y”) while the other two reports used strong causal 
framing (Experiment 1: “X leads to Y”, Experiment 2: “X causes Y”). In other words, Experiment 1 
used implicit causal language and Experiment 2 used explicit causal language, while the 
experiments were, for the rest, identical with respect to design, materials, and procedure. 
 To account for the possible influence of the content of a particular report, we 
counterbalanced the allocation of weak and strong causal framing conditions to the credibility 
conditions across the items, and created two versions of the experiments: Version A and B (see 
Appendix B for details). The order of reports was individually randomized for each participant. 
Procedure 
Participants judged each report in terms of the explanatory power of the hypothesis it described. 
Specifically, participants considered the statement: “The researchers’ hypothesis explains the results 
of the study”,  and expressed their judgments on a 7-point scale with the extremes (-3) "I strongly 
disagree" and (3) "I strongly agree", and the center pole (0) "I neither disagree nor agree". 
Analysis and Results 
Separate two-way ANOVAs were calculated for Experiment 1 and 2, with the factors Credibility 
(low, high) and  Causal Framing (weak, strong). ANOVA of Experiment 1 (implicit causal 
language) revealed a main effect of Credibility, F (1, 202) = 84.5; p < .001; ηpart
2
 = 0.30. There was 
no main effect of Causal Framing (p = .37), and no interaction (p = .08). Pair-wise comparisons 
showed that incredible hypotheses were rated significantly lower than credible hypotheses, 
independently of the value of Causal Framing (incredible hypotheses: M = 0.26; SEM = 0.10; 
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credible hypotheses: M = 1.14; SEM = 0.09; t-test: t(202) = -9.2; p < 0.001; d = 0.67). See Figure 1. 
The results of Experiment 1 therefore indicate that the prior credibility of a hypothesis was a strong 
predictor of judgments of explanatory power. Instead, framing a hypothesis with implicit causal 
language did not have effects on explanatory judgment. 
 
 
Figure 1. The graph shows explanatory power ratings for credible and incredible statements in 
Experiment 1. Ratings were significantly higher for credible as opposed to incredible statements. 
Error bars show standard errors of the mean and are also expressed numerically, in parentheses next 
to the mean value. 
 
 
ANOVA of Experiment 2 (explicit causal language) revealed main effects of Credibility (F (1, 207) 
= 286.9; p <.001; ηpart
2
 = 0.58) and Causal Framing, F (1, 207) = 31.0; p <.001; ηpart
2 
= 0.13, as well 
as a significant interaction Credibility х Causal Framing, F (1, 207) = 37.6; p <.001; ηpart
2 
= 0.15. 
Figure 2 shows the effect sizes and the interaction between both factors as well as the relevant 
descriptives. 
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Figure 2. The graph shows how explanatory power ratings vary with regard to Credibility and 
Causal Framing (as presented in Experiment 2). Ratings were significantly higher for statements 
with high compared to low Credibility, and for statements with strong compared to weak Causal 
Framing. The graph shows the (significant) interaction between both factors. Error bars show 
standard errors of the mean and are also expressed numerically, in parentheses next to the mean 
value. 
 
The results of Experiment 2 therefore confirm that the prior credibility of a hypothesis is a strong 
predictor of judgments of the hypothesis’ explanatory power. Incredible hypotheses received 
negative explanatory power ratings, credible hypotheses receive positive ratings. The results also 
showed that explicit causal framing can increase ratings of explanatory power, but only for 
incredible hypotheses. While this effect may lead explanatory judgment astray, in most practical 
cases of explanatory reasoning, people are interested in the explanatory power of hypotheses which 
they find, at least to a certain extent, credible. As Figure 2 shows, there was no effect of causal 
framing on explanatory power in this important case. 
 All in all, the observed patterns in both experiments confirm that the prior credibility of a 
hypothesis plays a gate-keeping-role in explanatory reasoning: only credible causal hypotheses 
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qualify as explanatorily valuable. By contrast, implicit or explicit causal framing plays a small to 
negligible role in influencing judgments of explanatory power. 
  
 
Experiment 3: Credibility х Generalizability 
Participants 
Two-hundred-seven participants (mean age 33.4 years, SD = 9.1; 123 male) from America (n = 
156), India (n = 37) and other countries completed Experiment 3 for a small monetary payment. 
Design and Material 
The experiment resembled Experiment 1 and 2. Four vignettes, each of which included a headline 
and five sentences, presented credible and incredible hypotheses. The relation between hypothesis 
and evidence was expressed by using the causally neutral wording "X co-occurs with Y". The 
critical manipulation concerned the sample descriptions used in the vignettes, which expressed 
either narrow or wide generalizability of the study’s result. For narrowly generalizable results, the 
second sentence of a report indicated that the sample of the study encompassed around 5 people 
(e.g. "The researchers studied 6 people"). For widely generalizable results, the sample included 
about 10,000 people (wide generalizability condition, e.g. "The researchers studied 9891 people"). 
 To control for the possible influence of the content of a particular report, we 
counterbalanced the allocation of narrow and wide generalizability conditions to the credibility 
conditions across the items, and created two versions of the experiments (see Appendix C for 
detailed information). The order in which reports were presented to the participants was 
individually randomized for each participant. 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to carefully assess each report with regard to Explanatory Power. 
Participants’ ratings were collected on 7-point scales, with the extreme poles (-3) "I strongly 
disagree" and (3) "I strongly agree", and the center pole (0) "I neither disagree nor agree". 
15 
 
Analysis and Results 
The ratings were analyzed with a two-way ANOVA with the factors Credibility (low, high) and 
Generalizability (narrow, wide). ANOVA revealed significant main effects of Credibility, F (1, 206) 
= 83.830; p <.001; ηpart
2 
= 0.289; and Generalizability, F (1, 206) = 29.593; p < .001; ηpart
2 
= 0.126, 
and no interaction Credibility х Generalizability (p = .085, n.s.). 
 As with Experiment 1 and 2, credible hypotheses achieved significantly higher ratings than 
incredible hypotheses (incredible hypotheses: M = -0.01; SEM = 0.10; credible hypotheses: M = 
0.95; SEM = 0.08; t-test: t(206) = -9.2; p < .001; d = 0.72). Furthermore, reports with wide 
generalizability achieved significantly higher ratings compared to reports with narrow 
generalizability (narrow: M = 0.21; SEM = 0.10; credible hypotheses: M = 0.73; SEM = 0.08; t-test: 
t(206) = -5.4; p < .001; d = 0.40). Figures 3 and 4 show the main effects for both variables. 
 
Figure 3. The graph shows how explanatory power ratings vary with regard to Credibility. Ratings 
were significantly higher for statements with high compared to low Credibility. The graph shows 
the main effect for this factor. Error bars show standard errors of the mean and are also expressed 
numerically, in parentheses next to the mean value. 
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Figure 4. The graph shows how explanatory power ratings vary with regard to Generalizability. 
Ratings were significantly higher for statements with high compared to low Generalizability. The 
graph shows the main effect for this factor. Error bars show standard errors of the mean and are also 
expressed numerically, in parentheses next to the mean value. 
 
 
Experiment 4 and 5: Credibility х Statistical Relevance 
Experiment 4 and 5 examined in what way probabilistic information influences explanatory 
judgments and how statistical information is taken into account for credible versus incredible 
hypotheses. Experiment 4 presented the statistical information numerically, Experiment 5 presented 
it visually. 
Participants 
Two-hundred-three participants (mean age 34.7 years, SD = 9.5; 122 male) from America (n = 168), 
India (n = 15), and other countries completed Experiment 4 for a small monetary payment. A new 
sample of N = 208 participants (mean age: 36.0 years, SD = 19.7; 133 male), from America (n = 
122), India (n = 69), and other countries completed Experiment 5 for a small monetary payment. 
Design and Material 
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The experiments resembled the previous ones. The four vignettes presented credible and incredible 
hypotheses. The sample descriptions in the vignettes were chosen such that both generalizability 
and causality were perceived as "neutral", according to the results of our pre-study. This meant that 
we opted for a medium-sized population sample (like in Experiment 1 and 2) and the wording “X 
co-occurs with Y” (like in Experiment 3). The novel manipulation was implemented in the part of 
the vignette where the results of the study are reported. This part now included statistical 
information. In a case of weak statistical relevance, the frequency of the property of interest was 
almost equal in the treatment and control group, e.g.: "Among the participants who regularly 
consumed anabolic steroids, 26 out of 120 (= 22%) exhibited an exceptional level of physical 
strength. Among the participants who did not regularly consume anabolic steroids, 24 out of 120 (= 
20%) exhibited an exceptional level of physical strength". For strong statistical relevance, there was 
a notable difference in the frequency of the property of interest, e.g.:  "Among the participants who 
regularly consumed anabolic steroids, 50 out of 120 (= 42%) exhibited an exceptional level of 
physical strength. Among the participants who did not regularly consume anabolic steroids, 7 out of 
120 (= 6%) exhibited an exceptional level of physical strength". While Experiment 4 represented 
the statistical information numerically like in the previous sentences, Experiment 5 stated the same 
absolute numbers and replaced the accompanying percentages with two pie charts (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Visual representation of statistical information of the fictitious research groups as 
provided in Experiment 5. 
 
As in the previous experiments, we counterbalanced the allocation of the weak statistical relevance 
and strong statistical relevance conditions across the items, and created two versions of each 
experiment (see Appendix D for detailed information). The order of  reports was individually 
randomized for each participant. 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to carefully assess each report with regard to Explanatory Power. Again, the 
ratings of the participants were collected on 7-point scales, with the extreme poles (-3) "I strongly 
disagree" and (3) "I strongly agree", and the center pole (0) "I neither disagree nor agree". 
Analysis and Results 
Separate two-way ANOVAs were calculated for Experiment 4 and 5, with the factors Credibility 
(low, high) and Statistical Relevance (weak, strong). ANOVA of Experiment 4 revealed significant 
main effects of Credibility (F (1, 202) = 65.3; p <.001; ηpart
2 
= 0.24) and Statistical Relevance (F (1 
,202) = 74.2; p <.001; ηpart
2 
= 0.27) and a significant interaction Credibility х Statistical Relevance 
(F (1, 202) = 47.7; p <.001; ηpart
2 
= 0.19). 
 Figure 6 shows the effect sizes and the interaction between both factors as well as the 
relevant descriptive statistics. Positive levels of explanatory power were only achieved for highly 
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credible hypotheses and high statistical relevance. The other conditions roughly led to the same 
explanatory power ratings. This suggests that both factors act as a gate-keeper in explanatory 
reasoning: if they take their low values, no hypothesis can be rated as explanatorily powerful. On 
the other hand, if both conditions are satisfied, the effect is very pronounced. 
 
 Figure 6. The graph shows how explanatory power ratings vary with regard to Credibility and 
Statistical Relevance (as presented in Experiment 4). Ratings were significantly higher for 
statements with high compared to low Credibility, and for statements with high compared to low 
Statistical Relevance. The graph shows the (significant) interaction between both factors. Error bars 
show standard errors of the mean and are also expressed numerically, in parentheses next to the 
mean value. 
 
Similar results were obtained for Experiment 5. ANOVA of Experiment 5 revealed significant main 
effects of Credibility, F (1, 207) = 38.2; p <.001; ηpart
2 
= 0.16, and Statistical Relevance, F (1 ,207) 
= 152.5; p <.001; ηpart
2 
= 0.42, and a significant interaction Credibility х Statistical Relevance, F (1, 
207) = 47.4; p <.001; ηpart
2 
= 0.10. 
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Figure 7. The graph shows how explanatory power ratings vary with regard to Credibility and 
Statistical Relevance (as presented in Experiment 5). Ratings were significantly higher for 
statements with high compared to low Credibility, and for statements with high compared to low 
Statistical Relevance. The graph shows the (significant) interaction between both factors. Error bars 
show standard errors of the mean and are also expressed numerically, in parentheses next to the 
mean value. 
 
Figure 7 shows the effect sizes and the interaction between both factors as well as the relevant 
descriptives. We found a slightly different interaction pattern than in Experiment 4. Again, both 
variables have to take their high values for a hypothesis to be rated as explanatorily powerful. 
However, we also see that the gate-keeping role of both variables is weaker than in the case where 
statistical information was only presented numerically. Either variable taking its high value suffices 
for a judgment of positive (albeit weak) explanatory power. Like in Experiment 4, the level of 
explanatory power was by far the highest in the condition where both credibility and statistical 
relevance were high. 
 
Discussion 
We examined the impact of four factors---prior credibility, causal framing, generalizability, and 
statistical relevance---on judgments of explanatory power. In a series of five experiments, we varied 
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both the subjective credibility of an explanation and one of the other factors: causal framing, 
generalizability, and statistical relevance (both with numeric and with visual presentation of the 
statistics). In Experiments 1 and 2 we found that the impact of causal language on judgments of 
explanatory power was small to negligible. Experiment 3 showed that generalizable explanations 
with wider scope positively affected judgments of explanatory power. In Experiments 4 and 5, we 
found that explanatory power increased with the statistical relevance of the hypothesis for the 
observed evidence. 
 Across all experiments, we found that the prior subjective credibility of a hypothesis had a 
striking effect on how participants assessed explanatory power. In particular, the credibility of an 
explanatory hypothesis had an important gate-keeping function: the impact of statistical relevance 
on explanatory power was more significant when credibility was high. On the other hand, the high 
credibility of a hypothesis controlled for the potentially misleading effect of causal framing on 
explanatory judgment. 
 This pattern of findings is consistent with existing psychological research demonstrating that 
people resist endorsing explanatory hypotheses that appear unnatural and unintuitive, given their 
background common-sense understanding of the physical and of the social world (Bloom & 
Weisberg 2007). Our findings are also consistent with the idea that stable background personal 
ideologies (often referred to as “worldview”) can reliably predict whether people are likely to reject 
well-confirmed scientific hypotheses  (Lewandowsky et al., 2013; Colombo, Bucher, & Inbar, 
2016). So, scientific hypotheses that are inconsistent with our prior, background, common-sense 
beliefs or in tension with personal ideologies are likely to be judged as implausible, and may not be 
endorsed as good explanations unless they are supported by extra-ordinary evidence gathered by 
some trustworthy source. On the other hand, for hypotheses that fit our prior, background belief or 
ideology, we often focus on information that, if the candidate explanatory hypothesis is true, would 
boost its goodness (Klayman & Ha 1987). 
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 This kind of psychological process of biased evidence evaluation and retention bears a 
similarity to the properties of incremental measures of confirmation called Matthew properties 
(Festa, 2012). According to confirmation measures presenting Matthews properties, an equal degree 
of statistical relevance leads to higher (incremental) confirmation when the hypothesis is already 
credible than when it is incredible. The same was observed in our experiment, where the effect of 
statistical relevance on different dimensions of explanatory power was much more pronounced for 
credible than for incredible hypotheses. Moreover, the highest ratings of explanatory power, across 
different experiments, were achieved when, in addition to a credible hypothesis, the report was 
widely generalizable or statistical relevance was high. Only in those cases, a substantial degree of 
explanatory power was achieved. This confirms that those factors play a crucial role in explanatory 
reasoning: a good explanation has to be credible, statistically relevant and widely generalizable. In 
comparison, the impact of causal framing is negligible. 
 The interplay we observed between statistical relevance, prior credibility, and explanatory 
power is also relevant to understanding the relationship between abductive and probabilistic 
reasoning. In abductive reasoning, explanatory considerations are taken to boost the credibility of a 
target hypothesis while inducing a sense of understanding (Lipton, 2004). Previous psychological 
studies investigated the effect on people’s assessments of explanatory power of factors like 
simplicity (Lombrozo, 2007; Bonawitz & Lombrozo, 2012) and coherence (Koslowski et al. 2008). 
Our results advance this body of literature by suggesting that the generalizability of a hypothesis 
and its statistical relationship to the evidence will boost the acceptability of the hypothesis, 
especially when the hypothesis has a high prior subjective credibility. High prior credibility may 
also insulate an explanation from causal framing effects, which may produce a deceptive sense of 
understanding (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002; Trout, 2002). 
 Overall, our experiments show that explanatory power is a complex concept, affected by 
considerations of prior credibility of a (causal) hypothesis, its generalizability and its statistical 
relevance for the evidence. These factors also figure prominently in (normative) philosophical 
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theories of explanation. For instance, the D-N model (Hempel, 1965) stresses the generality of the 
proposed explanation, the causal-mechanical account (Woodward, 2003) requires a credible causal 
mechanism, and statistical explanations are usually ranked according to their relevance for the 
observed evidence (Salmon, 1970, Schupbach & Sprenger, 2011). 
 On the other hand, the multitude of relevant factors in explanatory judgment explains why it 
has been difficult to come up with a theory of abductive inference that is both normatively 
compelling and descriptively accurate: after all, it is difficult to fit quite diverse determinants of 
explanatory judgment into a single unifying framework. In that spirit, we hope that our results will 
promote an interdisciplinary conversation between empirical evidence and philosophical theorizing, 
and about the “prospects for a naturalized philosophy of explanation” in particular (Lombrozo 2011, 
549; Schupbach, 2015; Colombo, 2016). 
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Appendix A (Pre-tests) 
 
A.1 List of statements expressing relationships between an explanans (X) and an explanandum Y) 
presented in the pre-study on Causal Framing. 
 
Statements 
Ratings: Mean (Standard 
Deviation) 
X prevents Y. -0.59 (1.98) 
X co-occurs with y. 0.09 (1.60) 
X predicts Y. 0.25 (1.57) 
X is associated with Y. 0.70 (1.83) 
X promotes Y. 0.80 (1.46) 
X is correlated with Y. 0.86 (1.64) 
X causes Y. 1.02 (2.01) 
X leads to Y. 1.23 (1.67) 
 
  
A.2 List of hypotheses, presented to the participants (N = 42) of the pre-study on Credibility, and 
mean ratings (and standard deviation), collected on 7-point scales with the options: "I strongly 
disagree" (-3), "I disagree", "I slightly disagree", "I neither agree nor disagree" (0), "I slightly 
agree", "I agree", "I strongly agree" (3). 
  
Hypotheses 
Ratings: Mean (Standard 
Deviation) 
Eating pizza co-occurs with immunity to flu. -1.95 (1.45) 
Drinking apple juice co-occurs with anorexia. -1.86 (1.28) 
Breast feeding co-occurs with hair loss in the baby. -1.83 (1.46) 
Vegetarianism co-occurs with aggressiveness. -1.76 (1.36) 
Helpfulness co-occurs with blond hair. -1.79 (0.23) 
Exercising co-occurs with frequent headache. -1.45 (1.61) 
  
Kleptomania co-occurs with sexual deprivation. -1.33 (1.53) 
Eating crab co-occurs with good eyesight. -1.12 (1.58) 
Attending religious services co-occurs with positive mood. 0.14 (1.69) 
Drinking coffee co-occurs with higher blood pressure. 0.43 (1.73) 
Vandalism co-occurs with low self-esteem. 0.52 (1.15) 
Low interest rates co-occur with a high number of newly built 
houses. 
0.69 (1.65) 
Professional success co-occurs with parental income above $ 
100,000/year. 
0.74 (1.50) 
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Having breakfast co-occurs with a healthy body mass index. 0.79 (1.22) 
Rainy days co-occur with birds breeding. 0.79 (1.62) 
Eating hot dogs co-occurs with obesity. 0.83 (1.50) 
Drinking whisky co-occurs with liver cancer. 0.90 (1.65) 
Smoking cannabis co-occurs with drowsiness. 1.10 (1.27) 
Well-being co-occurs with frequent smiling. 1.14 (1.46) 
Consuming anabolic steroids co-occurs with physical strength. 1.21 (1.86) 
 
  
 
A.3 List of sample description statements presented in the pre-study on Generalizability 
  
1. Sample description based on the number of participants of a study 
 
Statements 
Ratings: Mean (Standard 
Deviation) 
The study investigates 5 people. -1.88 (1.60) 
The study investigates 50 people. -1.05 (1.82) 
The study investigates 100 people. -0.43 (1.78) 
The study investigates 500 people. 0.55 (1.70) 
The study investigates 1,000 people. 0.93 (1.80) 
The study investigates 10,000 people. 1.24 (2.05) 
 
  
2. Sample description based on the type of participants of a study 
Statements 
Ratings: Mean (Standard 
Deviation) 
The study investigates a group of people who sit in a park. -0.34 (1.88) 
The study investigates a group of people who work at a university. -0.05 (1.97) 
The study investigates a group of people who attend a religious 
ceremony. 0.07 (1.82) 
The study investigates a group of people who have their number in 
the telephone book. 0.12 (2.19) 
The study investigates a group of people who watch a movie in the 
cinema. 0.22 (1.80) 
The study investigates a group of people who wait for their flight at 
an airport 0.27 (1.91) 
The study investigates a group of people who attend a sports event. 0.29 (1.82) 
The study investigates a group of people who shop at a mall. 0.49 (1.69) 
The study investigates a group of people who are registered on 
Facebook. 0.85 (1.85) 
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Appendix B (Experiment 1 and 2) 
 
The table shows the allocation of strong (as opposed to weak) causal framing conditions as 
implemented by the wording "X leads to Y" (Experiment 1) and "X causes Y" (Experiment 2) to the 
four hypotheses in the two different versions (A and B) of Experiment 1 and 2. In Experiment 1, n = 
103 participants completed version A, the remaining participants (N = 100) completed version B. In 
Experiment 2, N = 103 completed Version A and N = 108 completed version B. 
 Experiment 1 and 2 
Credibility Version A Version B 
Low 
 
 
Eating pizza is associated with 
immunity to flu. 
Weak Causal Framing 
Eating pizza leads to/causes
2
 immunity to 
flu. 
Strong Causal Framing 
Low Drinking apple juice leads to/causes 
anorexia. 
Strong Causal Framing 
Drinking apple juice is associated with 
anorexia. 
Weak Causal Framing 
High Well-being is associated with frequent 
smiling 
Weak Causal Framing 
 
Well-being leads to/causes frequent 
smiling 
Strong Causal Framing 
High Consuming anabolic steroids leads 
to/causes physical strength. 
Strong Causal Framing 
Consuming anabolic steroids is associated 
with physical strength. 
Weak Causal Framing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
The phrasing "leads to" was used for high/strong causal items in Experiment 1, and was replaced 
by the explicit causal wording "causes" in Experiment 2. 
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Appendix C (Experiment 3) 
 
The table shows the allocation of "narrow" and "wide generalizability" conditions to the four 
hypotheses in the two different versions (A and B) of Experiment 3. N = 104 participants completed 
Version A, the remaining participants (N = 104) completed Version B. 
 Experiment 3 
Credibility Version A Version B 
Low 
 
 
Eating pizza co-occurs with immunity 
to flu. [...] The researchers examined 6 
persons. 
Narrow generalizability 
Eating pizza co-occurs with immunity to 
flu. [...] The researchers examined 10187 
persons. 
Wide generalizability 
Low Drinking apple juice co-occurs with 
anorexia. [...] The researchers 
examined 9891 persons. 
Wide generalizability 
Drinking apple juice co-occurs with 
anorexia. [...] The researchers examined 6 
persons. 
Narrow generalizability 
High Well-being co-occurs with frequent 
smiling. [...] The researchers examined 
10391 persons. 
Wide generalizability 
Well-being co-occurs with frequent 
smiling. [...] The researchers examined 5 
persons. 
Narrow generalizability 
High Consuming anabolic steroids co-occurs 
with physical strength. [...] The 
researchers examined 5 persons. 
Narrow generalizability 
Consuming anabolic steroids co-occurs 
with physical strength. [...] The 
researchers examined 9971 persons. 
Wide generalizability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
Appendix D (Experiment 4 and 5) 
 
The table below shows the allocation of "low" and "high statistical relevance" conditions to the 
four hypotheses in the two different versions (A and B) of Experiment 4 and 5. N = 101 participants 
completed Experiment 4’s version A, the remaining participants (N = 102) completed Experiment 
4’s version B. In Experiment 5, N = 106 completed Version A and N = 102 completed version B. 
 Experiment 4 and 5 
Credibility Version A Version B 
Low 
 
 
Eating pizza co-occurs with 
immunity to flu. [...] Among 
the participants who 
regularly ate pizza, 27 out of 
120 (= 23%) exhibited 
immunity to flu. Among the 
participants who did not 
regularly eat pizza, 25 out of 
120 (= 21%) exhibited 
immunity to flu. 
Low statistical relevance 
Eating pizza co-occurs with immunity 
to flu. [...] Among the participants who 
regularly ate pizza, 48 out of 120 (= 
40%) exhibited immunity to flu. Among 
the participants who did not regularly 
eat pizza, 6 out of 120 (= 5%) exhibited 
immunity to flu. 
High statistical relevance 
Low Drinking apple juice co-
occurs with anorexia. 
[...]Among the participants 
who regularly drank apple 
juice, 48 ouWeak support by 
statisticst of 120 (= 40%) 
exhibited anorexia. Among 
the participants who did not 
regularly drink apple juice, 6 
out of 120 (= 5%) exhibited 
anorexia. 
High statistical relevance 
Drinking apple juice co-occurs with 
anorexia. [...]Among the participants 
who regularly drank apple juice, 26 out 
of 120 (= 22%) exhibited anorexia. 
Among the participants who did not 
regularly drink apple juice, 24 out of 
120 (= 30%) exhibited anorexia. 
Low statistical relevance 
High Consuming anabolic 
steroids co-occurs with 
physical strength. [...] 
Among the participants who 
regularly consumed anabolic 
steroids, 26 out of 120 (= 
22%) exhibited an 
exceptional level of physical 
strength. Among the 
participants who did not 
regularly consume anabolic 
steroids, 24 out of 120 (= 
Consuming anabolic steroids co-
occurs with physical strength. [...] 
Among the participants who regularly 
consumed anabolic steroids, 50 out of 
120 (= 42%) exhibited an exceptional 
level of physical strength. Among the 
participants who did not regularly 
consume anabolic steroids, 7 out of 120 
(= 6%) exhibited an exceptional level of 
physical strength. 
High statistical relevance 
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20%) exhibited an 
exceptional level of physical 
strength. 
Low statistical relevance 
High Well-being co-occurs with 
frequent smiling. [...] Among 
the participants who reported 
a high level of well-being, 50 
out of 120 (= 42%) smiled 
frequently. Among the 
participants who did not 
report a high level of well-
being, 7 out of 120 (= 6%) 
smiled frequently. 
High statistical relevance 
Well-being co-occurs with frequent 
smiling. [...] Among the participants 
who reported a high level of well-being, 
27 out of 120 (= 23%) smiled 
frequently. Among the participants who 
did not report a high level of well-being, 
25 out of 120 (= 21%) smiled 
frequently. 
Low statistical relevance 
 
